Landlord\u27s Duty to Re-Rent Premises by Butler, A. L.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 6 | Number 1 Article 18
12-1-1927
Landlord's Duty to Re-Rent Premises
A. L. Butler
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
A. L. Butler, Landlord's Duty to Re-Rent Premises, 6 N.C. L. Rev. 68 (1927).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol6/iss1/18
68 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
are more than merely evidences of debt. The debt is inseparable
from the paper which declares and constitutes it. . . . 'It is
clear from the statutes referred to and the authorities cited and
from the understanding of business men as well as jurists and leg-
islators, that mortgages, bills and notes have for many purposes
been regarded as property and not as mere evidences of debt and
that they may thus have a situs at the place where they are found,
like other visible, tangible chattels.'" It is submitted that with this
authority, bonds, bills and notes and other similar instruments may
be considered as tangible personal property, and so come within the
rule of the Frick case. But the Supreme Court has not yet decided
squarely that bonds and negotiable notes may be taxed at situs only,
and there is reason to believe that the Frick case will not be followed
as to bonds and negotiable notes.
Fourth; may a state tax the bond-holder's interest represented by
a mortgage on property within the state? Under the present rule,
of which the principal case is an example, such an interest is not
taxable but there is considerable argument on the other side, the
essence of which is that the laws of the state in which the property
is located must be invoked for the protection of the bond-holder's
interest.1 0
Several plans for relieving the situation have been formulated
by the National Tax association, the most promising of which seems
to be the plan for reciprocity among the states.1" It seems that this
is the path to the solution rather than by court decision.
G. M. SnAW.
LADLoR 'S DUTY To RE-RENT PREMISES
In Walsh et al. v. E. G..Shinner & Co.,' a tenant abandoned
premises two years before the expiration of his lease. Before vaca-
'Italics ours. DeGanay v. Lederer, etc., 250 U. S. 376 (1918) at 381, but
see State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wallace 300 (1872) at page 323:
"It is undoubtedly true that actual situs of personal property which has a
visible and tangible existence, and not the domicile of the owner, will, in many
cases, determine the state in which it may be taxed. The same is true of
public securities consisting of municipal bonds, and circulating notes of bank-
ing institutions; the former by general use, have acquired the character of, and
are treated as, property in the place where they are found, though removed
from the domicile of the owner; the latter are treated and pass as money
wherever they are. But other personal property, consisting of bonds, mort-
gages and debts generally, have no situs independent of the domicile of the
owner. .
"State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds or Notes Secured by a Mortgage on
.Land in the State, supra, note 4.
'Proceedings of the National Tax Ass'n., 1926, at page 325.
120 Fed. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 3, 1927).
NOTES
ting he undertook to get the landlords a tenant for the remainder of
the term and promised to continue responsible for the reserved rent.
The tenant found and presented to the landlords several persons who
would have been suitable and responsible tenants and who desired
to rent the premises upon the same terms. But the landlords
declined except for a prohibitive rental and, declaring a breach of
the lease, entered and took possession. The landlords sued for
damages for breach of the lease reckoned on the cost of restoring
the premises to their original condition, and on loss of rent for the
remainder of the term, and had a verdict for a sum which excluded
rent. They appealed assigning error in the admission of testimony
to prove that loss of rent was due to their refusal to accept suitable
tenants when available, and in instructions to the jury that it was their
duty as landlords to mitigate the damages resulting from the breach
of the lease, if possible. Held, that the judgment be affirmed.
By an early English statute2 the landlord had no right to enter
premises abandoned by the tenant except by special proceeding.
Likewise there are two early decisions in this country, evidently
influenced by the English law, which hold that the landlord is a
trespasser if he enters before the end of the term, though the tenant
has abandoned the premises.3 But by the weight of authority in
this country today, it is held that the landlord may enter the
abandoned premises to perform any necessary repairs or to prevent
a deterioration of the premises, without subjecting himself to liabil-
ity.4 And a few jurisdictions hold that the landlord may resume
possession of the premises as if the lease had never been made.5 In
an Iowa and a North Carolina case 6 it is decided that after resump-
tion of control of the premises by the landlord the tenant cannot
assert a right to return. However, if his re-entrance is in exclusion
of the tenant, the decisions vary as to the result. If he re-lets the
premises,7 or re-enters for the purpose of assuming occupancy him-
'11 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 16 (1737).
'Brown v. Kite, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 233 (1814) ; Shannon v. Burr, 1 Hilt.
39 (N. Y., 1856).
'Rucker v. Mason, 161 Pac. 195 (Okl., 1916); Ruple v. Taughenbaugh, 72
Colo. 171, 210 Pac. 72 (1922); Scott v. Beecher, 91 Mich. 590, 52 N. W. 21
(1892) semble.
'Wheat v. Watson, 57 Ala, 581 (1877); Kiplinger v. Green, 61 Mich. 340,
28 N. W. 121 (1886) ; Zigler v. McClellan, 15 Or. 499, 16 Pac. 179 (1887).
'Hailer v. Squire, 91 Iowa 10, 58 N. W. 921 (1894); Torrans v,. Stricklin,
52 N. C. (Jones Law) 50 (1859).TKean v. Rogers, 146 Iowa 559, 123 N. W. 754 (1909) ; McGinn v. Glad-
ding Dry Goods Co., 40 R. I. 348, 101 AtI. 129 (1917); Gray v. Kaufman
Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 56 N. E. 403 (1900) ; note, 3 A. L. R. 1080. Contra: Hoke
v. Williamson, 98 Kan. 580, 158 Pac. 1115 (1916).
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self, s most courts hold this a surrender by operation of law. If the
lease provides that upon non-payment of rent there may be a re-entry
and consequent termination of the leasehold estate, there is a danger
that the landlord may be held to have ended the term by forfeiture?
Or the act of the landlord in making a new lease, together with the
entrance and possession of the new lessee, may be construed as an
eviction of the original tenant.' 0  If the court concludes that the
landlord has effected a release of the tenant by any of the foregoing
methods, the tenant's liability for rent as such is terminated, because
such liability is based on the relationship between landlord and tenant.
Therefore the question, whether upon abandonment of the
premises the landlord may lease to another without thereby termina-
ting the tenant's liability for rent, becomes one of great practical
importance. Numerous decisions hold that the landlord may so
re-let to another and still hold the former tenant." In other juris-
dictions, in order to prevent a surrender, the landlord must notify
the tenant that the re-letting is on the latter's account.' 2 The general
rule and weight of authority is that a landlord, on abandonment of
the premises by the tenant, is under no obligation to re-let them; he
may remain inactive and sue the tenant for rent as it matures. 13
Of course this result is eminently correct where the entrance of the
landlord is to be attended by any of the disastrous results of
forfeiture, etc., noted above; and in such jurisdictions it can never
be the so called "duty"'. 4 of the landlord to re-rent the premises.
'Dennis v. Miller, 68 N. J. L. 320, 53 AtI. 394 (1902); Hart v. Pratt, 19
Wash. 560, 53 Pac. 711 (1898).
'International Trust Co. v. Weeks, 203 U. S. 364 (Mass., 1906); Woodbury
v. Print, 198 Mass. 1, 84 N. E. 441 (1908).
" Cibell v. Hill, 1 Leo. 110, 74 Eng. Reprint 102 (1588) ; Hall v. Burgess,
5 B. & C. 332 (Eng., 1826).
'Marshall v. Grosse Clothing Co., 184 Ill. 421, 56 N. E. 807 (1900);
Schelky v. Koch, 119 N. C. 80, 25 S. E. 713 (1896); Murill v. Palmer, 164
N. C. 50, 80-S. E. 55 (1913) ; Auer v. Haffman, 132 Wis. 620, 112 N. W. 1090
(1907).
"Hayes v. Goldman, 71 Ark. 251, 72 S. W. 563 (1903) ; Brown v. Cairns,
63 Kan. 584, 66 Pac. 639 (1901).
" Abraham v. Gheens, 205 Ky. 289, 265 S. W. 778 (1924); Goldman v.
Broyles, 141 S. W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); note, 40 A. L. R. 190.
"According to Hohfeld's terminology it is erroneous to use the 'term duty
in this sense. Where a duty exists there is a concurrent liability, and hence
if this relation of the landlord to the tenant were a duty in the strict, legal
sense, it would follow that upon failure to make a reasonable attempt to miti-
gat8 the damages, he would himself be liable to an action for damages result-
ing from breach of the duty. Obviously this is not the result. A correct state-
ment would be that the plaintiff rested under a legal disability to claim for
damages which he might reasonably have obviated or reduced. Hohfeld, Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions, pp. 35, 65; 26 Yale L. J. 710; 28 ibid., 827; 29 ibid.,
130; Rock v. Vandine, 106 Kan. 588, 189 Pac. 157; 30 Yale L. J. 100.
NOTES
But in the jurisdictions where the landlord can re-let without for-
feiture, is there any reason why the general duty to the defendant
to minimize his damages should not be applicable to the landlord
in this case? It is recognized that if the landlord re-enters under a
provision of the lease permitting him to do so after his tenant has
vacated the premises,' 5 or where the lease requires him to re-rent
in case of abandonment, 16 it is his duty to use reasonable diligence in
seeking a new tenant in order to lessen his damages. But some
courts are in accord with the principal case in recognizing this re-
letting by the landlord as a duty irrespective of the provisions of
the lease.17 This application of the rule of avoidable consequences
would permit the landlord upon breach of a lease only to recover
the rent for the remainder of the term, less such revenue as he could
reasonably have secured by re-letting during that period.
This is apparently the better rule. It is in conformity with the
present day development of the law of landlord and tenant which
is away from the feudal basis of privity of estate and toward the
modern conception of contractual obligation. In the event of its
general adoption the penalizing of the landlord incident to a sur-
render by operation of law, forfeiture or eviction will be supplanted
by the principles governing the effect of repudiation, breach and
rescission of other contracts.' 8 The landlord then will be remitted
from the economic waste of standing idly by and permitting the
premises to lie vacant, and forbidden a recovery for damages which,
by reasonable efforts, he could have avoided.' 9
A. L. BUTLER.
Marling v. Allison, 213 Ill. App. 224 (1919) ; Bradbury v. Higginson, 162
Cal. 602, 123 Pac. 797 (1912)."Harmon v. Callahan, 214 Ill. App. 104 (1919). Cf. Imperial Water Co.
v. Cameron, 67 Cal. App. 591, 228 Pac. 678 (1924).
t Campbell v. McLaurin Invest. Co., 74 Fla. 501, 77 So. 277 (1917) ; Murill
v. Palmer, supra, note 11; semble; Holton v. Andrews, 151 N. C. 340, 66 S. E.
212 (1909) semble. See Roberts v. Watson, 196 Iowa 816, 820, 195 N. W. 211,
212 (1923), approved in 9 Iowa L. B. 140.
'Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant; Williston, Contracts, Vol. III; 23 Mich.
L. Rev. 211.1rn a, jurisdiction such as North Carolina where the duty to re-let is
recognized, the practical question arises 4s to whether the burden is on the
landlord to allege and prove reasonable efforts to re-rent or upon the tenant
to plead in mitigation a failure of the landlord to make such efforts. As to
avoidable consequences generally, the accepted rule is that the burden of proof
is upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff, by the exercise of proper
industry, could have mitigated his damages, and that in absence of such proof
the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount fixed by the contract. Beissel v.
Vermillion Farmer's Elevator Co., 102 Minn. 229, 113 N. W. 575 (1907);
Milage v. Woodward, 186 N. Y. 252, 78 N. E. 873 (1906); Mindes Millinery
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DISPARAGEMENT OF GOODS AS TRADE LIBEL
The general American rule is that Equity Courts have no juris-
diction to interfere by injunction to restrain the publication of a
trade libel.' The reason usually given is not constitutional, as a
restraint upon free speech or the press, but because, as the courts
and text writers say, there is an adequate remedy at law.2  This
denial of equitable relief to one libeled will oftentimes work an
irreparable injury and leave him, in effect, remediless. Manifestly
the legal remedy offers no relief against an insolvent; and even
though damages could be collected, more often than not it would be
impossible to know or prove the actual damage which results from a
disparaging statement. The English Courts have led the way from
this position, and they now exercise the same injunctive discretion
over trade libels as over other torts.$ And the modern American
decisions, while not so outspoken as the English authorities, are
Co. v. Wellborn, 201 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 1059 (1918). But a minority
view adopts the contrary result requiring the plaintiff to allege diligence on
his part and the results thereof, in mitigation of damages. Shepard v. Gambill,
29 Ky. L. Rep. 1163, 96 S. W. 1104 (1906) ; Hunt v. Crane, 33 Miss. 669, 69
Am. Dec. 381 (1857); Williston, Contracts, § 1360. And this would seem the
more desirable rule in view ol the difficulty of the tenant in ascertaining the
facts as to the possibility of re-letting.
16 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 629; 2 High, Injunctions (4th ed.) 968;
Nims, Unfair Competition, 485, 262; 22 Cyc 900; Kidd v'. Horry, 28 Fed. 773
(C. C. Penn., 1886); Citizen's Light, etc. Co. v'. Montgomery, 171 Fed. 553
(C. C. Ala., 1909); American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 Fed. 351 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1913) ; Willis v. O'Connell, 231 Fed. 1004 (S. D. Ala., 1916) ; Francis v.
Flynn, 118 U. S. 385 (1885) ; Mitchell v. Grand Lodge, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 306,
121 S. W. 178 (1909) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 49 Ga.
70, 15 Am. Rep. 674 (1872), the court said: "It is well settled that an injunction
will -not be granted to restrain libel of title or reputation. Not that it is not
wrong, not that thb wrong might not be irreparable, but simply because equity
courts have refused to act in such cases." Illustrates the stubborn attitude the
courts have taken. Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 19
Am. Rep. 310 (1873) ; Marlin Fire Arms Co. v'. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64
N. E. 163 (1902).
Francis v. Flynn, 118 U. S. 385 (1885): "Plaintiff has full remedy at law.
If equity could interfere in such cases, it would draw to itself the
greater part of litigation properly belonging to courts of law"; Citizens Light
etc. Co. v. Montgomery, 171 Fed. 553 (C. C. Ala., 1909); Baltimore Life Ins.
Co. v. Gleisner, 202 Pa. St. 356, 51 AtI. 1024 (1902) ; Chamber of Commerce
v. Fed. Trade Commission, 13 Fed. (2nd.) 673, 686 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926):
"No jurisdiction in equity to enjoin publication of a libel . . . but not
because of constitutional reasons, and such jurisdiction could be conferred by
statute."
'Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339 (1878); Halsey v. Brotherhood, 15
Ch.D. 514 (1879); (required, however, plaintiff to go first to law and have
jury pass upon question whether libelous . . . if so would grant the de-
cree) ; Liverpool Assn. v. Smith, 37 Ch.D. 170 (1887) ; James v. James, 13 Eq.
421 (1872). (No longer require plaintiff to go first to law court-will grant
the injunction if the matter is libelous.)
